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Prayers can be powerful: a source of strength, peace, and hope. 
Although they can be used to unite communities, prayers 
undoubtedly have private elements. People often recite them in 
silence, eyes closed, calling out to some higher force. Even when 
prayers are delivered in a group setting, they affect people privately. 
Those listening to the individual leading the group in prayer 
experience the leader’s words differently: some listeners affirm the 
words voiced and some quietly add their own requests. 
Leading a group in prayer in a public setting blurs the line 
between public and private. Such blurring implicates a constitutional 
tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause. This tension is magnified when the constitutionality of prayer 
is questioned in the context of democratic participation. 
This Note questions the constitutionality of prayer led by elected 
officials in open legislative sessions. Part II provides a brief history of 
the drafting and passing of the Establishment Clause. Part III explains 
that current Supreme Court precedent holds legislative prayer to be 
constitutional, but the relevant cases⎯Marsh v. Chambers1 and Town 
of Greece, NY v. Galloway2⎯do not address the constitutionality of 
legislator-led prayer. 
Part IV confronts the circuit split on the constitutionality of 
legislator-led legislative prayer. On the one hand, in Bormuth v. 
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County of Jackson,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held legislator-led legislative prayer to be constitutional. On 
the other hand, in Lund v. Rowan County, N.C.,4 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit came to the opposite 
conclusion, despite the case having strikingly similar facts. Part V 
confronts this tension. First, I challenge the validity of the precedent 
on legislative prayer. Then, accepting the current precedents as valid, I 
argue legislator-led prayer in public legislative sessions is 
unconstitutional. This analysis evaluates the interplay of the original 
intent of the Establishment Clause, the changes in the social structure 
of the United States since the eighteenth century, and the unique role 
of the legislator, separate from that of a guest minister or ordinary 
citizen. 
Ultimately, I attempt to inject empathy into legal analysis by 
pointing to the tangible effects of legislator-led prayer: alienation 
from the community and increased violence against religious 
minorities. I hope to highlight these harms as sufficient in themselves 
to implicate the Establishment Clause and to bolster the argument for 
holding this practice to be unconstitutional. 
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO LEGISLATIVE PRAYER 
A. The Creation and Ratification of the Establishment Clause 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.”5 
While engineering the ideological foundation of the United States, 
through the drafting and passing of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights, the Founders grappled with significant issues concerning the 
new country’s collective identity, including the existence of an 
established religion in the new country. To be clear, the Founders 
identified themselves as Christians.6 Still, the creation of the United 
 
 3.  870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017).  
 4.  863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017).  
 5.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 6.  Mark David Hall, Did America Have a Christian Founding?, THE HERITAGE 
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States was substantially related to a need to secure religious freedom, 
which could only flourish in the absence of established state-religion.7 
Thus, the importance of such a constitutional protection was at the 
forefront of the minds of not only the Framers, but also the states that 
ratified the Constitution. Although nine of the thirteen colonies had 
established churches immediately before the revolution, and 
approximately half of the new states maintained some kind of official 
religious establishment when the First Amendment was ratified,8 
disestablishment gradually spread through the colonies starting in the 
early nineteenth century.9 The last state-sponsored church was 
disestablished in 1832.10 
Both James Madison, the primary author of the First Amendment, 
and the members of the First Congress shared a broad consensus 
regarding the role of religion in the new country: 
They all wanted religion to flourish, but they all wanted a secular 
government. They all thought a multiplicity of sects would help 
prevent domination by any one sect. All of them also thought 
religion was useful, perhaps even necessary, for teaching morality. 
They all thought a free republic needed citizens who had a moral 
education. They all thought the primary responsibility for this 
education lay with the states. And they all agreed that Article I 
gave Congress no direct power to deal with the subject. The 
disagreement was over what Congress should be allowed to do 
pursuant to some other delegated power.11 
Similarly, states were worried that the creation of established 
churches threatened citizens liberty of conscience. For instance, at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention, John Smilie voiced an objection to 
the Constitution without an Establishment Clause, stating that if “the 
 
FOUNDATION (2011), https://www.heritage.org/political-process/report/did-america-have-
christian-founding (stating that “[o]ne possibility is simply that the Founders identified 
themselves as Christians. Clearly, they did. In 1776, every European American, with the 
exception of about 2,500 Jews, identified himself or herself as a Christian.”).  
 7.  See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 513 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[t]he 
Reformation of the Sixteenth Century spawned an explosion of Christian faiths. Many of those 
practicing these new Christian faiths sought religious freedom in America and found refuge 
from the tyranny inflicted by sectarian governments. To guarantee religious liberty to all 
persons, including those practicing the emerging Christian religions, the First Amendment was 
provided.”).  
 8.  Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: 
Establishments of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2107 (2003).   
 9.  See id. at 2126.  
 10.  Hall, supra note 6.  
 11.  Michael J. Malbin, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17 (1978).  
MASRANI DJCLPP NOTE MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019  2:34 PM 
100 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
rights of conscience [were] not secured . . . Congress may establish any 
religion.”12 A petition at this convention echoed this concern in its 
proposed amendment, mandating “[t]hat the rights of conscience 
should be secured to all men, that no man should be molested for his 
religion, and that none should be compelled contrary to their 
principles and inclination to hear or support the clergy of any one 
religion.”13 Additionally, the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, a 
local newspaper at the time, printed a similar formulation: 
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship 
Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own conscience 
and understanding: And that no man ought, or of right can be 
compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any 
place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against 
his own free will and consent . . . .14 
Virginia’s elites shared these apprehensions. Patrick Henry 
cautioned Virginia residents that “a religious establishment was in 
contemplation under the new government.”15 A letter from a local 
militiaman from Virginia to James Madison warned of local Baptists 
who were “much alarm’d fearing relegious [sic] liberty is not 
Sufficiently secur’d” in a constitution barring an established church.16 
The letter continued, 
What is dearest of all – Religious Liberty, is not Sufficiently 
Secured . . . if a Majority of Congress with the president favored 
one system more then another, they may oblige all others to pay to 
the Support of their System as Much as they please and if 
Oppression does not ensue, it will be owing to the Mildness of 
Administration & not to any Constitutional defense.17 
 
 12.  Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
346, 398 (2002) (citing Proceedings and Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention, reprinted in 2 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 326, 592 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter “DOCUMENTARY HISTORY”]). 
 13.  Id. (citing Petition Against Confirmation of the Ratification of the Constitution, Jan. 
1788, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY supra note 12 at 710–11 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976)). 
 14.  Id. at 399 (citing Timothy Meanwell, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 29, 1787, 
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12, at 511 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1983)).   
 15.  Id. (citing Letter from John Blair Smith to James Madison (June 12, 1788), reprinted in 
9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12, at 607–08 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1983). 
 16.  Id. (citing Letter from Joseph Spencer to James Madison (Feb. 28, 1788), reprinted in 
16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12, at 252 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1986)) [hereinafter Letter from Spencer to Madison].  
 17.  Id. at 400 (citing Letter from Spencer to Madison, supra note 16).  
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In the first session of Congress representatives from Virginia,18 
North Carolina19, Rhode Island20 and New York21 proposed almost 
identical amendments to the Constitution, calling for free exercise of 
religion with no established religion. New Hampshire went so far to 
propose that “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to 
infringe the rights of conscience.”22 
In a brief House discussion of the proposed First Amendment, 
concerning the portion of the Amendment that read, “no religion 
shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be 
infringed,”23 Madison stated that “he apprehended the meaning of the 
words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce 
the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in 
any manner contrary to their conscience.”24 
Overall, it was broadly agreed that both liberty of conscience 
through the prevention of an established religion was a basic and 
inalienable right.25 
B. The Relationship Between the Establishment Clause and 
Legislative Prayer 
Considering the Framers’ emphasis on preserving a secular state, 
the United States Supreme Court’s upholding legislative prayer 
offered by guest ministers seems to be an exception to the 
presumption against state-established religion. The Supreme Court 
has regularly upheld a secular state. For instance, the Supreme Court 
 
 18.  Id. at 401 (citing 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of 
the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787, 
at 659 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1901)) (George Mason proposed the following amendment to 
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, which was adopted by the ratifying convention in its entirety: 
“That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can 
be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men have 
an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates 
of conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established, 
by law, in preference to others.” Id.).   
 19.  Id. (citing 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12 at 244 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990)). 
 20.  Id. (citing 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 12 at 334 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990)). 
 21.  Id. at 328 (specifying “[t]hat the people have an equal, natural, and unalienable right 
freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that 
no religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others”). 
 22.  Id. at 326.  
 23.  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 757 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).  
 24.  Id. at 758 (emphasis added).  
 25.  Feldman, supra note 12, at 405.  
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has found unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause a state 
requirement that a candidate for public office declare a belief in God 
to be eligible for the position,26 a state-composed non-denominational 
prayer to begin the school day,27 and a state law reimbursing religious 
schools with state funds to purchase textbooks and to pay teachers’ 
salaries.28 Justice Kennedy, during the oral arguments for Town of 
Greece, called legislative prayer a “historical aberration.”29 One 
scholar has even described it as “born of an unprincipled practice that 
seemed relatively harmless when the national population was 
overwhelmingly Protestant.”30 
The Continental Congress began the tradition of opening its 
sessions with prayer in 1774 and the First Congress, in 1789, 
implemented a policy to select a chaplain for opening services.31 
Madison himself, however, resisted the practice of legislative prayer 
by a paid minister. He “labeled legislative prayer an unconstitutional 
irregularity that he hoped would not distort our future understanding 
of the Establishment Clause.”32 Madison called the establishment of 
congressional chaplaincies “a palpable violation of equal rights, as 
well as of Constitutional principles,” and he hoped their “daily 
devotions” would not come to be seen as a “legitimate precedent.”33 
He understood that paying chaplains and ministers out of public 
funds was a constitutional anomaly, and suggested that members of 
Congress pay for services from their own pockets.34 
The legislative prayer exception is the result of judicial analysis 
focused on the historical practice of paid chaplains offering prayer at 
the opening of legislative sessions, in an attempt to effectuate the 
 
 26.  Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).  
 27.  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).  
 28.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
 29.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) 
(No. 12-696) [hereinafter Galloway Oral Argument]. 
 30.  Ian Bartrum, The Curious Case of Legislative Prayer: Town of Greece v. Galloway, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. 218, 219 (2014).  
 31.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 (1983).  
 32.  James Madison, Detached Memoranda, JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 745, 762–63 
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).  
 33.  Id. at 763.  
 34.  Noah Feldman, DIVIDED BY GOD 247 (2005). But cf. Patrick M. Garry, Religious 
Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential 
Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20 (2005) (stating that when Madison became 
president, he recommended at least four days of national prayer and thanksgiving and 
supervised federal funding given to congressional and military chaplains and missionaries 
charged with converting the Indians to Christianity.). 
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original intent of the Framers in implementing the First 
Amendment.35 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT RELATING 
TO LEGISLATIVE PRAYER 
In Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway, the 
Supreme Court held that prayers led by guest ministers or members 
of the public at the beginning of public legislative sessions are 
constitutional. These cases, however, do not address the unique harms 
and interests triggered by elected officials leading public sessions with 
prayer. Thus, while relevant to the present analysis, the 
constitutionality of prayer in these cases does not mean that 
legislator-led public prayer must also be constitutional. 
A. The Supreme Court first confronted the constitutionality of 
legislative prayer in Marsh 
The Executive Board of the Legislative Council of the Nebraska 
Legislature was responsible for choosing a chaplain biennially.36 
Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian minister, served as a chaplain 
offering prayer at the beginning of each Nebraska Legislature session 
since 1965.37 For his services, Palmer got paid $319.75 per month while 
the legislature was in session.38 Besides Palmer, the Legislature also 
often hired other guest chaplains to officiate prayers.39 
Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska Legislature,40 
brought suit claiming that the Nebraska Legislature’s chaplaincy 
practice violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.41 
The District Court denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of 
legislative immunity and held that the Establishment Clause was not 
violated by the prayers, but by paying the chaplain with public funds.42 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, combined 
these questions and prohibited Nebraska from engaging in any aspect 
 
 35.  See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (1983) (holding that legislator-led prayer did not violate the 
Constitution since the practice was deeply rooted in the country’s history and tradition); Town 
of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014) (holding that sectarian prayer was not by itself 
constitutional based on the prevalence of such prayer throughout the country’s history).  
 36.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784.  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 793.  
 40.  Id. at 785.  
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id. at 785.  
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of an established chaplaincy practice.43 The Supreme Court then 
granted certiorari. 
The Court held the use of chaplains to open legislative meetings 
with prayer is deeply embedded in the country’s history and 
traditions.44 The Continental Congress opened its sessions with a 
prayer offered by a paid chaplain.45 While prayers were not offered by 
a chaplain during the Constitutional Convention, the First Congress 
adopted a policy of selecting a chaplain to open each session with 
prayer.46 In 1789, the Senate elected its first chaplain, and the House 
soon followed suit.47 The Court concluded, “the men who wrote the 
First Amendment Religion Clause did not view paid legislative 
chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for 
the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without 
interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”48 
But the Court did acknowledge that although Nebraska’s practice 
did not threaten the Establishment Clause, it was possible for other 
instances of legislative prayer to do so.49 The Court offered two 
limiting principles: a prayer would be unconstitutional if, (1) a prayer 
was overly divisive and denominational (the “nonsectarian 
standard”)50 or, (2) if prayer-givers were chosen solely on the basis of 
their religious affiliation (the “impermissible motive”).51 Even when 
delineating these limits, though, the Court assumed a guest prayer-
giver, and did not overlook the prayer-giver’s identity in its 
determination. 
 
 43.  Id. at 786.  
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. at 787.  
 46.  Id. at 787–88.  
 47.  Id. at 788.  
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id. at 795 (“It is of course true that great consequences can grow from small 
beginnings, but the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness to 
distinguish between real threat and mere shadow.”). 
 50.  See id. at 792–95.   
 51.  See id. at 793–94 (“The Court of Appeals was concerned that Palmer’s long tenure has 
the effect of giving preference to his religious views. We cannot, any more than Members of the 
Congresses of this century, perceive any suggestion that choosing a clergyman of one 
denomination advances the beliefs of a particular church. To the contrary, the evidence 
indicates that Palmer was reappointed because his performance and personal qualities were 
acceptable to the body appointing him. . . . Absent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment 
stemmed from an impermissible motive, we conclude that his long tenure does not in itself 
conflict with the Establishment Clause.”). 
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Marsh, then, held that legislative prayer did not violate the 
Constitution, despite being religious. In doing so, Marsh forged an 
exception to the principle that the government must be neutral 
towards religion and, accordingly, not endorse one religion over 
another.52 
The Court understood this exception to be narrow: a singular 
“special instance [where it] found good reason to hold governmental 
action legitimate even where its manifest purpose was presumably 
religious.”53 Lower courts, too, affirmed this narrow interpretation of 
Marsh and the acceptance of legislative prayer, calling Marsh “one-of-
a-kind.”54 
Yet the scope of the limits on legislative prayer remained 
uncertain. To the plaintiff’s complaints of prayers being sectarian, the 
Marsh court responded, “‘[t]he content of the prayer is not of concern 
to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer 
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or 
to disparage any other, faith or belief,’55 and that the chaplain had 
tried his best to “remove all references to Christ.”56 These two phrases 
have conjured different standards of permissible legislative prayer: 
supporters of legislative prayer often cite the former and interpret 
Marsh to be a broader standard, and only to be struck down when it 
“proselytize[s] or advance[s] any one, or disparage[s] any other, faith 
or belief.”57 Opponents of the practice advocate for a stricter 
nonsectarian requirement in the vein of “remov[ing] all references to 
Christ This division highlights the difficulty in defining and applying 
the quasi-nonsectarian requirement in the legislative prayer context, 
as prayers inherently must be sectarian. “Religious liberty for all 
cannot really be served in any legislative prayer scheme.”58 
 
 52.  Id. at 791.  
 53.  McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 n.10 (2005) (citing Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 
40 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[O]nly in the most extraordinary circumstances could 
actual worship or prayer be defended [as constitutional]. We have upheld only one such prayer 
against Establishment Clause challenge, and it was supported by an extremely long and 
unambiguous history.”). 
 54.  Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Doe v. 
Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 211 (5th Cir. 2006); Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 
370 (4th Cir. 2003); Newman v. City of East Point, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2002).  
 55.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95.  
 56.  Id. at n.14. 
 57.  Id. at 794. 
 58.  Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious 
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 1023 (2010). 
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This uncertainty begs the question: now that there has been a 
departure from the neutrality principle, how far can the departure go? 
B. The Supreme Court then addressed the scope of legislative prayer 
in Town of Greece 
In 1999, John Auberger, then newly-elected town supervisor of 
Greece, New York, implemented a new prayer practice: after the 
Pledge of Allegiance, Auberger “would invite a local clergyman to the 
front of the room to deliver an invocation.”59 After the invocation, he 
would thank the minister for being the “chaplain of the month” and 
present him with a commemorative plaque.60 The stated purpose for 
this practice was to “place town board members in a solemn and 
deliberative frame of mind, invoke divine guidance in town affairs, 
and follow a tradition practiced by Congress and dozens of state 
legislatures.”61 The town never excluded or denied an opportunity to a 
would-be prayer giver, keeping open the prayer-giving opportunity to 
any layperson of any persuasion, including an atheist.62 The town 
“neither reviewed the prayers in advance of the meetings nor 
provided guidance as to their tone or content.”63 
After the plaintiffs vocalized their concerns of the pervasive 
Christian themes in the prayers, the town invited a Jewish layman, the 
chairman of the local Baha’i temple, and a Wiccan priestess to deliver 
prayers.64 The plaintiffs, Galloway and Stephens, brought suit in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of New York, 
alleging that the prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause by 
preferring Christians over other prayer givers and by sponsoring 
sectarian prayers.65 They sought an injunction that would limit the 
town to “inclusive and ecumenical” prayers that referred solely to a 
“generic God” and would not associate the government with any one 
faith.66 The District Court on summary judgment upheld the prayer 
practice as consistent with the First Amendment.67 But the United 
 
 59.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014). 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. at 572.  
 65.  Id.  
 66.  Id. at 572–73. 
 67.  Id. at 573 
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,68 and the 
Supreme Court then granted certiorari. 
The Court held that sectarian prayer was not, by itself, 
unconstitutional.69 The pertinent question was whether the prayer 
practice in Town of Greece fit within the history and tradition long 
followed by Congress and the state legislatures.70 The Court further 
held that the Establishment Clause did not require “nonsectarian or 
ecumenical prayer as a single, fixed standard.”71 Instead, the “relevant 
constraint” on faith-specific prayer “derive[d] from its place at the 
opening of legislative sessions, where it [was] meant to lend gravity to 
the occasion and reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage.”72 
Just as in Marsh, sectarian prayers offered in Town of Greece by guest 
ministers, including a Jewish layman and Wiccan priestess, fell within 
the country’s historical and traditional outline.73 Finally, the Court 
concluded that the town’s prayer practice did not coerce attendee 
participation.74 Although no single test commanded a majority, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the plurality stated that “[t]he analysis would 
be different if town board members directed the public to participate 
in the prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that 
their decisions might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the 
prayer opportunity.”75 Justice Thomas, on the other hand, stated that 
coercion was limited to “coercive state establishments” “by force of 
law or threat of penalty,”76 including practices like “mandatory church 
attendance, levying taxes to generate church revenue, barring 
ministers who dissented, and limiting political participation to 
members of the established church.”77 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER 
The Sixth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit addressed the 
constitutionality of legislators’ opening public sessions with prayer in 
 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id. at 577.  
 70.  Id. at 578.  
 71.  Id.   
 72.  Id. at 583. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. at 589.  
 75.  Id. at 588.  
 76.  Id. at 608.  
 77.  Id.  
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Bormuth v. County of Jackson78 and Lund v. Rowan County, North 
Carolina,79 respectively. Yet these courts came to opposite conclusions. 
The Bormuth court held the practice to comport with the 
Establishment Clause under Marsh and Town of Greece. The Lund 
court disagreed. 
A. The Sixth Circuit Confronted the Constitutionality of Legislator-
Led Prayer in Bormuth 
i. Peter Bormuth Felt Alienated By Legislator-Led Prayer in 
Jackson County and Challenged the Constitutionality of the Practice 
Peter Bormuth’s objections to the Jackson County Board of 
Commissioners’ practice of opening public meetings with exclusively 
Christian prayers were met with a disgusted face and a turned back.80 
Bormuth, a self-professed Pagan and Animist, frequently attended the 
public meetings of the Jackson County Board of Commissioners (the 
“Board”) in Jackson County, Michigan.81 The Board was comprised of 
nine elected individuals.82 At the beginning of every meeting, 
following a call to order, one of the commissioners asked Bormuth 
and the other attendees to “rise and assume a reverent position,” or 
to “please stand up” or to “please bow [their] heads and . . . pray.”83 
Following this request, one of the Commissioners would offer a 
prayer, followed by the Pledge of Allegiance, and county business.84 
The Commissioners offered prayers on a rotating basis and neither 
the other Commissioners nor the Board as a whole reviewed or 
approved in advance the content of the prayers.85 One such prayer 
that Bormuth offered was as follows: 
Bow your heads with me please. Heavenly father we thank you for 
this day and for this time that we have come together. Lord we ask 
that you would be with us while we conduct the business 
of Jackson County. Lord help us to make good decisions that will 
be best for generations to come. We ask that you would bless our 
troops that protect us near and far, be with them and their families. 
Now Lord we wanna [sic] give you all the thanks and all the praise 
 
 78.  870 F.3d 494, 525 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 79.  863 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 80.  Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 525 (Moore, J., dissenting).  
 81.  Id. at 498.  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
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for all that you do. Lord I wanna [sic] remember bereaved families 
tonight too, that you would be with them and take them through 
difficult times. We ask these things in your son Jesus’s name. 
Amen.86 
Bormuth “felt like he was being forced to participate in a religion 
to which he did not subscribe in order to bring a matter of concern to 
his local government.”87 In another meeting in August 2013, Bormuth 
was met with another prayer: 
Please rise. Please bow our heads. Our heavenly father we thank 
you for allowing us to gather here in your presence tonight. We ask 
that you watch over us and keep your guiding hand on our 
shoulder as we deliberate tonight. Please protect and watch over 
the men and women serving this great nation, whether at home or 
abroad, as well as our police officers and firefighters. In this we 
pray, in Jesus name, Amen.88 
Bormuth did not rise for this prayer but remaining seated made 
him feel isolated and worried that the Board would hold it against 
him.89 Another prayer called to “[b]less the Christians worldwide who 
seem to be targets of killers and extremists.”90 When Bormuth voiced 
his concerns that the prayers may violate the Establishment Clause, 
“one of the Commissioners ‘made faces expressing his disgust’ and 
then turned his chair around, refusing to look at Bormuth while he 
spoke.”91 Ten days later, Bormuth filed suit against the County, 
alleging that the prayers violated the Establishment Clause.92 While 
this suit was pending, the Board nominated residents to the County’s 
new Solid Waste Planning Committee, but did not nominate Bormuth, 
intensifying Bormuth’s fears of being adversely treated for speaking 
up.93 In an article published shortly after, two commissioners 
confirmed their disapproval of Bormuth and the suit, stating, 
“Bormuth is attacking us and, from my perspective, my Lord and 
savior Jesus Christ,” and, “[a]ll this political correctness, after a while I 
get sick of it.”94 
 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. at 527. 
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. at 512. 
 91.  Id. at 527. 
 92.  Id. at 499. 
 93.  Id. at 527. 
 94.  Id.  
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Bormuth then filed an amended complaint, adding the 
Commissioners’ decision not to nominate him to the Solid Waste 
Planning Committee, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, 
and nominal damages.95 Both parties filed motions for summary 
judgment.96 
The district court granted the County’s motion for summary 
judgment and denied Bormuth’s summary-judgment motion.97 The 
district court concluded that “although the prayers were “exclusively 
Christian,” they were composed of only “benign religious references,” 
making Bormuth’s reaction to them “hypersensitive.”98 Further, it was 
held to be immaterial that all Commissioners were Christian, as it 
only reflected “the community’s own overwhelmingly Christian 
demographic.”99 On the issue of coercion, the court noted that 
“Bormuth’s subjective sense of affront resulting from exposure to 
sectarian prayer is insufficient to sustain an Establishment Clause 
violation.”100 
Bormuth appealed.101 On appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit ruled in Bormuth’s favor on the Establishment 
Clause issue.102 Then, the Sixth Circuit, granted rehearing en banc sua 
sponte.103 
ii. The Sixth Circuit Relied on the History and Tradition of Prayer 
at Public Meetings to Uphold Jackson County’s Practice as 
Constitutional 
On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit understood the purpose of 
legislative prayers as being to “[invite] lawmakers to reflect upon 
shared ideals and common ends before they embark on the fractious 
business of governing.”104 It emphasized that the Supreme Court has 
recognized “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose 
a Supreme Being,”105 making opening public sessions with prayers 
 
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Id. at 529.  
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. at 499.  
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. at 511.  
 105.  Id. at 503 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).  
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“deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”106 The 
court asked: (a) Did Jackson County’s prayer practice fall outside our 
historically accepted traditions because the Commissioners 
themselves, not chaplains or invited community members, led these 
prayers?107 And, (b) Was Jackson County’s prayer practice so coercive 
as to be unconstitutional?108 
Bormuth argued that as only Commissioners offered prayers, and 
each Commissioner was Christian, only Christian prayers were being 
offered.109 Thus, these elements together amounted to the Jackson 
County Board of Commissioners’ endorsing Christianity.110 The court 
rejected this argument.111 
The court concluded that neither Marsh nor Town of Greece was 
dispositive on the significance of the identity of the prayer giver, and 
instead intended for the inquiry to be more holistic.112 Relying on 
amicus briefs by the State of Michigan and Twenty-one Other States, 
Local and State Legislatures, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
and Members of Congress, the court pointed to multiple examples of 
legislator-led prayers.113 Jackson County offered a 2002 National 
Conference of State Legislatures study that stated, “. . . legislators 
gave prayers in thirty-one states,” and “[f]orty-seven chambers allow 
people other than the designated legislative chaplain or a visiting 
chaplain to offer the opening prayer. Legislators, chamber clerks and 
secretaries, or other staff may be called upon to perform this opening 
ceremony.”114 However, while the court repeatedly asserted that this 
practice has been present in state capitols for over one hundred and 
fifty years, there is no indication of how pervasive such practices were, 
i.e. how consistently practiced or accepted these were within each 
capitol, or for how continuous a period of time they had occured, i.e. 
whether they were infrequently practiced or not. 
The court rationalized legislator-led prayer practices in light of the 
purpose of legislative prayer: to invite “lawmakers to reflect upon 
 
 106.  Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983)). 
 107.  Id. at 509.  
 108.  Id. at 508.  
 109.  Id. at 509.  
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  See id. at 509–10 (referencing an instance of a legislator-led prayer during the Illinois 
Constitutional Convention on January 12, 1870). 
 114.  Id. at 511.  
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shared ideals and common ends before they embark on the fractious 
business of governing.”115 Emphasizing this interest for the individual 
legislator to follow their conscience, the court called attention to the 
Town of Greece instruction that “government must permit a prayer 
giver to address his or her own God or gods as conscience dictates,” 
and that it was not the role of the judiciary to act “as [a] supervisor[ ] 
and censor[ ] of religious speech.”116 Ultimately, the court found the 
identity of the prayer-giver as a legislator irrelevant, and the practice 
consistent with the country’s history and tradition of legislative 
prayers.117 
iii. The Sixth Circuit Held that the Christian Imagery of the 
Prayers Did Not Violate the Establishment Clause 
The court held that the content of the prayers was consistent with 
constitutionally compliant legislative prayer practices.118 Though the 
prayers invoked Christian imagery, the court found this imagery to be 
within the purview of Town of Greece, and that the founders 
“embraced these universal and sectarian references as ‘particular 
means to universal ends.’”119 As long as the invocations did not 
“denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, 
or preach conversion” and any pattern of prayers did not “denigrate, 
proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose,” they fell 
within the constitutional limits of Town of Greece.120 Further, a stray 
remark by a legislator that could be construed to fall out of these 
limits was held to be insufficient to overcome a long respected and 
revered practice.121 
Finally, the court held that the individual prayers by 
Commissioners could not reflect an endorsement of a religion by the 
Board or by other Commissioners.122 Although all the Commissioners 
were Christian, “faiths of Christianity are diverse, not monolithic.”123 
While the denominations of each Commissioner were not in the 
record, the court highlighted that it was possible for Commissioners of 
 
 115.  Id (citing Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 583 (2014)).  
 116.  Id. at 511–12 (alteration in original) (citing Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 581). 
 117.  Id. at 512.   
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Id. (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 582–584). 
 120.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 582, 584). 
 121.  See id. (“[T]his stray remark does ‘not despoil a practice that on the whole reflects and 
embraces our tradition.’” (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 584.)) 
 122.  Id. at 513. 
 123.  Id.  
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any faith to be elected.124 This dynamic potential of the position 
precluded endorsement of Christianity.125 
iv. The Sixth Circuit Rejected the Proposition that the Prayers 
Offered in Jackson County Had a Coercive Effect on the 
Constituents 
The court held that the Jackson County prayer practices were not 
unconstitutionally coercive.126 Declining to decide which plurality 
opinion—that of Justice Kennedy or that of Justice Thomas—
regarding coercion in Town of Greece was controlling, the court held 
that Bormuth failed both.127 Bormuth made three contentions of 
coercion: (a) the Board’s request that the members rise and be 
reverent, (b) two Commissioners turning their backs on him during 
the public comment section, and two others making statements of 
disapproval, and (c) his denial of a nomination to the committee.128 
In Town of Greece, Justice Kennedy found that the societal 
pressures an audience might feel while listening to prayers 
necessitated a fact-sensitive inquiry to be conducted in light of 
historical practices.129 Justice Kennedy presumed that a reasonable 
person was both aware of and understood the gravity of legislative 
prayers, and that legislative prayers were not means to “proselytize or 
force truant constituents into the pews.”130 
First, the appeals court held that “soliciting adult members of the 
public to assist in solemnizing the meetings by rising and remaining 
quiet in a reverent position” was not coercive,131 especially when 
preceded by a “please.”132 Second, it was not unconstitutional for two 
Commissioners to turn their backs and express disdain toward 
Bormuth.133 One of the commissioners responded in such a way in 
response to Bormuth’s comments on abortion, unrelated to the prayer 
practice, and so this behavior failed to establish a “pattern and 
 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  See id. (“Jackson County’s prayer policy permits prayers of any—or no—faith, and 
the County need not adopt a different policy as part of a ‘quest to promote a diversity of 
religious views.’”) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 586). 
 126.  Id. at 519.  
 127.  Id. at 515–16. 
 128.  Id. at 517. 
 129.  Id. at 507 (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587 (Kennedy, J.)).  
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id. at 517. 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id.  
MASRANI DJCLPP NOTE MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019  2:34 PM 
114 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
practice” of coercion against non-believers.134 Additionally, statements 
by the Commissioners post-litigation, including “What about my 
rights? . . . If a guy doesn’t want to hear a public prayer, he can come 
into the meeting two minutes late,” and “Bormuth is attacking us and, 
from my perspective, my Lord and savior Jesus Christ,” were held to 
be in reaction to Bormuth’s disapproval of them as individuals, and 
not Bormuth’s religious beliefs.135 Finally, Bormuth’s failure to be 
nominated to the Committee position was insufficient in itself to 
establish coercion because there was no proffer of evidence of a 
prejudicial reason behind this decision-making.136 As a result, the 
court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding this Jackson 
County prayer practice to pass constitutional muster.137 
B. The Fourth Circuit Confronted the Constitutionality of Legislator-
Led Prayer in Lund 
The Fourth Circuit met with facts substantially similar to Bormuth, 
but came to the opposite conclusion, holding that legislator-led prayer 
violated the Establishment Clause.138 Like Jackson County, Michigan, 
Rowan County, North Carolina had an elected Board of 
Commissioners.139 The five-member board met twice monthly.140 After 
a call to order, all five Commissioners asked the public to stand up 
and join them in worship, using phrases such as “Let us pray,” “Let’s 
pray together,” or “Please pray with me.”141 The prayers ended with 
“Amen,” and were followed by the Pledge of Allegiance and then 
county business.142 
Of all the prayers said in the five-and-a-half years for which video 
recordings are available, ninety-seven percent of the Board’s prayers 
included references to ‘Jesus,’ ‘Christ,’ or the ‘Savior.’143 No other 
religion was represented.144 Examples of prayers included: “Lord, we 
confess that we have not loved you with all our heart, and mind and 
strength, and that we have not loved one another as Christ loves us. 
 
 134.  Id. (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 589). 
 135.  Id. at 518.  
 136.  Id. at 519.  
 137.  See id. 
 138.  Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 295 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).  
 139.  Id. at 272.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Id. at 273. 
 144.  Id.  
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We have also neglected to follow the guidance of your Holy Spirit;” 
“[A]s we pick up the Cross, we will proclaim His name above all 
names, as the only way to eternal life;” and “Father, I pray that all may 
be one as you, Father, are in Jesus, and He in you. I pray that they may 
be one in you, that the world may believe that you sent Jesus to save 
us from our sins.”145 
With growing controversy over these prayers, some 
Commissioners publicly announced that they would continue 
Christian invocations for the community’s benefit.146 One 
Commissioner stated, “I will always pray in the name of Jesus . . . . 
God will lead me through this persecution and I will be His 
instrument.”147 
The plaintiffs were long-time Rowan County residents and active 
Board meeting attendees.148 They asserted that by exclusively 
associating with and delivering Christian prayers, the Board “sen[t] a 
message that the County and the Board favor Christians,” causing the 
plaintiffs to feel “excluded from the community and the local political 
process.”149 Further, the plaintiffs professed that they felt pressured to 
stand for prayers to avoid sticking out, and any resistance would 
impair their ability to advocate in other matters.150 After the district 
court enjoined the prayer practice, the Supreme Court decided Town 
of Greece.151 In light of this, both parties moved for summary 
judgment.152 The district court found that the prayer practice was both 
coercive and “‘deviate[d] from the long-standing history and 
tradition’ of legislative prayer.”153 On appeal, however, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and upheld Rowan 
County’s prayer practice.154 The Fourth Circuit then granted rehearing 
en banc.155 
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, en banc, concluded 
that the prayer practice in Rowan County “served to identify the 
 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Lund, 863 F.3d at 273. 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Id.  
 149.  Id. at 274 (alteration in original). 
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id.  
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F.Supp.3d 712, 723 
(M.D.N.C. 2015), rev’d, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016)).  
 154.  Id. at 275 (citing Lund v. Rowan County, 837 F.3d 407, 411–31 (4th Cir. 2016)). 
 155.  Id.  
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government with Christianity and risked conveying to citizens of 
minority faiths a message of exclusion.”156 It also held that because 
the Commissioners were the exclusive prayer-givers, “the practice 
[fell] well outside the more inclusive, minister-oriented practice of 
legislative prayer described in Town of Greece.”157 “Indeed,” the 
opinion states, “if elected representatives invite their constituents to 
participate in prayers invoking a single faith for meeting upon 
meeting, year after year, it is difficult to imagine constitutional limits 
to sectarian prayer practice.”158 To reach this conclusion, the Fourth 
Circuit had to answer the same questions confronted by the Sixth 
Circuit. First, whether the County’s prayer practice fell outside our 
historically accepted traditions because the Commissioners 
themselves, not chaplains, or invited community-members, led these 
prayers. Second, whether Rowan County’s prayer practice was so 
coercive as to be unconstitutional.159 
The court articulated the tradition of legislative prayer to include 
“the delivery of prayers by ‘a chaplain, separate from the legislative 
body.’”160 It stated that the Supreme Court had “consistently 
discussed legislative prayer practices in terms of invited ministers, 
clergy, or volunteers providing the prayer,”161 and noted that, “in 
elaborating on our national tradition of legislative prayer—the history 
informing its interpretation of the Establishment Clause—the Court 
ha[d] ‘not once described a situation in which the legislators 
themselves gave the invocation.’”162 
Unlike Town of Greece, where volunteer guest ministers, not 
elected government officials, offered the prayers,163 the court found 
that Rowan County’s prayers proffered solely by legislators created a 
“much greater and more intimate government involvement.”164 
Although Town of Greece did not explicitly discuss the constitutional 
 
 156.  Id. at 272.  
 157.  Id.  
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id. at 272.  
 160.  Id. at 274 (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 723 (M.D.N.C. 2015), 
rev’d, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016)). 
 161.  Id. at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. 
Supp. 3d 712, 722 (M.D.N.C. 2015), rev’d, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016)). 
 162.  Id. (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 722 (M.D.N.C. 2015), rev’d, 
837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016)). 
 163.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014). 
 164.  Lund, 863 F.3d at 278 (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 723 
(M.D.N.C. 2015), rev’d, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016)). 
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relevance of the prayer-giver’s identity, the court reasoned that the 
previous decision assumed the legislature would employ outside 
clergy to give prayers.165 The court added that Town of Greece 
“emphasized that the town ‘neither edit[ed] [n]or approv[ed] prayers’ 
offered by the guest ministers.”166 Instead, the plurality in Town of 
Greece reasoned that “[t]hese requests . . . came not from town 
leaders but from the guest ministers, who presumably [were] 
accustomed to directing their congregations in this way.”167 This 
suggested that the purpose and use of the prayers were to 
“acknowledge religious leaders and the institutions they 
represent[ed].”168 
The Fourth Circuit, emphasizing the lack of case law on lawmaker-
led prayer, referred to the National Conference of State Legislature 
Survey, also examined by the Bormuth court, which explained it was 
“tradition for a chaplain [and not a legislator] to be selected to serve 
the [legislative] body,”169 and to open meetings with prayer. The 
survey notes that while twenty-seven state legislative chambers 
designated an official chaplain, legislators led prayer only occasionally 
and more routinely invited guest ministers.170 The Fourth Circuit 
found that by delivering their own Christianity-based prayers, the 
Commissioners in Rowan County prevented the invocation of any 
other faith, and thus put the prayers outside the constitutional 
protection addressed in Town of Greece.171 The Establishment Clause 
functions to “safeguard[] religious pluralism,” the court stated, not to 
endorse the creation of a “de facto religious litmus test for public 
office,” or a “‘closed-universe’ of prayer-givers dependent solely on 
election outcomes,” like that created in Rowan County.172 Therefore, 
Rowan County’s prayer practice created divisions that led to 
impermissible, subtle coercion, and pressure on non-religious meeting 
attendees.173 
 
 165.  Id.  
 166.  Id. (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 581). 
 167.  Id. (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 589). 
 168.  Id. (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 567). 
 169.  Id. at 279 (alteration in original) (quoting NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, INSIDE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 5-147 (2002)). 
 170.  Id. (quoting Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae at 6–7, Lund v. Rowan 
County, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-565).  
 171.  Id. at 280.  
 172.  Id. at 282 (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 723 (M.D.N.C. 2015), 
rev’d, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016)). 
 173.  See id. (“[T]he intimacy of a town board meeting may push attendees to participate in 
the prayer practice in order to avoid the community’s disapproval. This is especially true where, 
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Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Town of Greece required examining 
the prayer practice from the perspective of a “reasonable observer,” 
presumed to be “acquainted with [the] tradition” of legislative 
prayer.174 However, the court reasoned that neither a reasonable 
observer nor an “exceptionally well-informed citizen steeped in the 
Court’s legislative prayer jurisprudence” could expect “to find 
exclusively sectarian invocations being delivered exclusively by the 
commissioners because, as noted, the Court has consistently spoken in 
terms of guest ministers and outside volunteers.”175 
At a point where no religion except Christianity was invoked at 
public meetings, “attendees must have come to the inescapable 
conclusion that the Board ‘favor[ed] one faith and one faith only.’”176 
And even though governments were not required to engage in 
religious balancing, the court contended that, “a tapestry of many 
faiths lessen[ed] that risk whereas invoking only one exacerbate[d] 
it.”177 
Further, and most importantly, although courts should not become 
censors of public prayer, the court explained that the content of the 
prayers offered by Rowan County risks “denigrat[ing] nonbelievers 
[and] religious minorities.”178 For example, these prayers portrayed 
Christianity as “the one and only way to salvation” and asked the 
“world [to] believe that [God] sent Jesus to save us from our sins.”179 
Although certain prayers at the heart of the controversy in Town of 
Greece evoked Christian imagery, their content did not rise to this 
level of exclusion and, more importantly, was not offered by 
lawmakers.180 In fact, considering the “intimacy of a town board 
meeting” and the carrying out of legislative and adjudicative business 
shortly after the prayers, the court held Rowan County’s prayer 
practice to present “to say the least, the opportunity for abuse.”181 
These factors compelled the plaintiffs to stand up to avoid their 
 
as here, the government has aligned itself with the faith that dominates the electorate.”).  
 174.  Id. at 283–84 (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 
565, 567 (2014)). 
 175.  Id. at 284.  
 176.  Id. (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 837 F.3d 407, 434 (4th Cir. 2016) (panel dissent)). 
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id. at 285 (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 
583 (2014)). 
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 571–72 (2014).  
 181.  Lund, 863 F.3d at 288 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Lund, 837 F.3d at 
436). 
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community’s disapproval.182 This was found to be especially true 
considering “one person who spoke out against the Board’s prayer 
practice was booed and jeered by her fellow citizens.”183 The court 
stated that defining this discomfort as hypersensitivity was wrong.184 
Finally, the court declined to find any “meaningful distinction 
between the commissioners and the Board.”185 The court explained 
that such line-drawing between the beliefs espoused by 
Commissioners in their official capacity and in their individual 
capacities was a distinction without a difference.186 Endorsing this 
distinction would “create a constitutional safe harbor for all prayers 
delivered by legislators ‘no matter how proselytizing, disparaging of 
other faiths, or coercive’ so long as the legislature itself did not 
collectively compose the prayers.”187 “When one of Rowan County’s 
commissioners leads his constituents in prayer,” the court continued, 
“he is not just another private citizen,” but a “representative of the 
state.”188 “His power to offer a prayer derives from this status; were he 
not a member of the Board, he would be barred from doing so.”189 The 
court concluded that it was “hard to believe that a practice observed 
so uniformly over so many years was not by any practical yardstick 
reflective of board policy.”190 
V. LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
A. Courts Should Reconsider Precedent on Legislative Prayer to 
Reflect Growing Religious Diversity and Societal Preferences 
The rationale of the Supreme Court precedent deeming guest 
minister-led or community-member-led legislative prayer 
constitutional is anchored in an analysis of the history and tradition of 
legislative prayer.191 This reasoning, however, might have outlasted its 
 
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Id. at 289.  
 186.  Id. at 307. 
 187.  Id. (quoting Supplemental Brief of Appellees at 13–14 n.5, Lund v. Rowan County, 
837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1591)). 
 188.  Id. at 290.  
 189.  Id.  
 190.  Id. (quoting Lund, 837 F.3d at 434 (panel dissent)). 
 191.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.   
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relevance, and thus might not bear the same persuasive force if 
revisited today. 
The Marsh Court and the Town of Greece Court interpreted the 
widespread use of chaplains by legislatures throughout history as 
evidence of the Founders’ intent not to erode such a practice in the 
passing of the Establishment Clause.192 Contemporaneous sources, 
however, also show a broadly shared intent of the Founders to 
maintain a secular state.193 Although interpreting the meaning of the 
Constitution through the actions of First Congress to accept the 
chaplaincy practice as valid under the Establishment Clause is 
legitimate, it is not the sole method of interpretation. This 
interpretation, moreover, loses its persuasiveness if it undermines the 
purpose of the Clause. The Founders included the Establishment 
Clause in the Bill of Rights “to stand as a guarantee that neither the 
power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to 
control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people 
can say,” or not say, so that personal beliefs are not “subjected to the 
pressures of government for change each time a new political 
administration is elected to office.”194 
As the Lund court stated, allowing elected officials to open public 
sessions with prayer in their official capacity must have led to the 
“inescapable conclusion that the Board ‘favor[ed] one faith and one 
faith only.’”195 Both the Lund and Bormuth prayers shared notable 
similarities: they evoked Christian sentiment in referring to Jesus, at 
the exclusion of all other beliefs; they included the pronoun “we,” 
incorporating the public that was present and listening; and they were 
both recited by elected officials, not simply guest ministers or 
members of the public.196 In this way the government officials 
endorsed Christianity at the expense of other beliefs and thus violated 
the Establishment Clause. 
Such an endorsement also undermines the original motivations of 
the First Amendment. As outlined in Part II, supra, the fear shared by 
many states was not merely a fear of an established religion, but a fear 
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of an infringement on citizens’ liberty of conscience, so that citizens 
might be compelled to hear or support the edicts of one religion over 
another. The Establishment Clause, then, does not merely exist to 
protect the public from the formal establishment of religion, but 
stands to defend against a deeper, subtler, coercion of religious beliefs. 
Securing liberty of conscience involves both the positive right to 
worship, or not to worship, according to the principles of a person’s 
conscience and the negative right to be free from the religious edicts 
of others, those wearing the cloak of apparent governmental 
authority. This understanding comports well with the Free Exercise 
Clause,197 as both negative and positive liberties support free exercise 
of religious beliefs, with the Establishment Clause only precluding a 
government endorsement of any one religion over another. 
Such an analysis, looking to effectuate the true intent of the 
drafters, has significant benefits. It precludes the abuse of judicial 
discretion, maintaining the balance of power between the judicial 
branch and legislative branch. By limiting interpretation to the intent 
of the drafters, the subjective opinions and biases of the presiding 
judges are minimized so that their role as neutral arbiters of the law 
can be meaningfully fulfilled. As Justice Scalia stated in a lecture at 
the University of Virginia, lawyers “are not trained to be moral 
philosophers,” and “[h]istory is a rock-solid science compared to 
moral philosophy.”198 Yet effectuating such original intent in the 
manner of the Marsh court is obviously not the sole method of 
constitutional interpretation, especially when it controverts the 
purpose of the constitutional provision interpreted. Instead, the 
Framers repeatedly “attempt[ed] to refine the wording of the text, 
either to eliminate vagueness, or to allay fears that overprecise 
language would be taken literally and that the aim of a given 
provision would thus be defeated.”199 Although there was significant 
debate over the language of the Constitution, there was no indication 
that the Framers expected future interpreters to effectuate their 
intent by seeking out extra-textual sources.200 
 
 197.  “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” U.S. 
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MASRANI DJCLPP NOTE MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/19/2019  2:34 PM 
122 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
Eighteenth-century American society, the period to which the 
Marsh Court looked in determining the intent of the drafters of the 
Establishment Clause, was drastically different from American society 
in 2019. The Establishment Clause cannot be meaningfully executed 
in a vacuum. In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, while the 
population was growing rapidly, American society consisted of free 
whites, enslaved people, and a small constituency of free people of 
color.201 In 1776, “every European American, with the exception of 
about 2,500 Jews, identified himself or herself as a Christian. 
Moreover, approximately 98 percent of the colonists were Protestants, 
with the remaining 1.9 percent being Roman Catholics.”202 
The variety of racial and ethnic groups in American society today 
is significantly more diverse.203 While at the time of founding religious 
diversity meant different denominations of Christianity, including 
Baptist, Methodist, and Episcopalian, the modern United States 
contains a more varied plurality of belief systems, from Hindus to 
Sikhs to Muslims to Christians to non-believers.204 Today, according to 
a survey by Pew Research Center, “77 percent of Americans are 
acquainted with someone who is nonreligious, 61 percent know 
someone who is Jewish and 38 percent know someone who is 
Muslim.”205 According to one expert, religious energy in the colonies 
was in the “ascension rather than the declension.”206 “Between 1700 
and 1740, an estimated 75 to 80 percent of the population attended 
churches, which were being built at a headlong pace.”207 Given the 
widespread acceptance and practice of Christianity—albeit different 
strands of Christianity—the ratification of the Establishment Clause 
evidences a fear of a government-sanctioned religion. While the scope 
of this “sanction” is debated, the Supreme Court has held in similar 
contexts that, “it is no part of the official business of government to 
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to 
recite as part of a religious program carried out by the 
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Government.”208 Although the cases in question do not require the 
audience to recite the prayers, the principle applies when the audience 
is asked to stand during the prayers, listen to other beliefs being 
denounced, or suffer adverse consequences for speaking against them. 
While the Establishment Clause surely bars a de jure sanctioning 
of religion by the government, the harms of a de facto sanctioning, 
such as in the legislative prayer cases, lack meaningful distinction 
from the former. Functionally, they both signify the endorsement by 
government officials of one religion over others. An elected official 
leading a public meeting with prayer involves the legislator using their 
official, public role to voice a private opinion that is perceived as a 
public opinion affirming a religion, generally Christian, in a public 
setting, to the exclusion of all other religions or non-religions. Such a 
religious endorsement of one religion over others might have the 
ideological and physical effects of disparaging, alienating, or 
proselytizing religious minorities in the community.209 This is the 
specific fear the Establishment Clause was meant to avoid.210 This fear 
was echoed in the complaint filed by the plaintiffs in Lund, who 
indicated that the legislator-led prayers made non-Christian groups 
feel excluded from the community and the local political process.211 It 
does not matter if the prayers are heterogenous or nonsectarian, as 
the recital of any prayer by a legislator, for that matter, comes to the 
exclusion of other prayers and non-prayers, and so inevitably 
constitutes a governmental affirmation of religion. 
The harms of a de facto sanctioning, or even acquiescence to 
legislator-led prayer, seem even more salient in the current political 
climate. In 2016, law enforcement agencies reported 6,121 incidents of 
hate crimes motivated by bias toward race, ethnicity, religion, sexual 
orientation, disability, gender or gender identity.212 Among them, 6,063 
were single-bias incidents, of which 54.2 % were anti-Jewish and 
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24.8% were anti-Islamic.213 Anti-Muslim hate crimes, specifically, have 
been on the rise: in 2016, anti-Islamic assaults exceeded the 2001 
total.214 The total number of anti-Muslim hate crimes rose from 154 in 
2014, to 257 in 2015, and then to 307 hate crimes in 2016.215 Similarly, 
there was a rise of anti-Jewish hate crimes from 664 in 2015 to 684 in 
2016.216 This data is collected by the FBI from 15,000 law enforcement 
agencies, which voluntarily participate and likely undercount the 
number of hate crimes per year.217 It may seem obvious, but behind 
each of these numbers and percentages exists a person who bore the 
brunt of another person’s being threatened or affronted by the 
former’s religion, leading the perpetrator to enact violence so as to 
ensure that the victim knew that her religion subordinated her to a 
second-class status. 
In such an environment, the de facto acceptance of a certain 
religion over another by legislative members in their official capacity 
could amplify to minority religious groups, who are already at a 
heightened risk of prejudice and violence, the relative devaluing of 
their religious beliefs. And, to the majority, it could mean an implicit 
approval of the attitudes that facilitate religious subordination of 
minority groups. As Justice Black noted in Engel v. Vitale, “one of the 
greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his 
own way lay in the Government’s placing its official stamp of 
approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of 
religious services.”218 “Our Founders were no more willing to let the 
content of their prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they 
pleased be influenced by the ballot box than they were to let these 
vital matters of personal conscience depend upon the succession of 
monarchs.”219 
Of the harms of such prayer, Justice Black continued, “history of 
governmentally established religion, both in England and in this 
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country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one 
particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had 
incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held 
contrary beliefs.” To Justice Black, this very same history revealed 
“that many people had lost their respect for any religion that had 
relied upon the support of government to spread its faith.”220 
B. Under Current Precedent, Legislator-Led Prayer is Still 
Unconstitutional Given the Meaningful Differences between 
Legislators and Others 
Even if the Marsh and Town of Greece holdings are considered 
the appropriate method of constitutional interpretation, because of 
the distinct identity of the prayer-giver in the Lund and Bormuth 
cases—an elected official—the Marsh and Town of Greece holdings 
do not resolve the uncertainties in Lund and Bormuth. An important 
point of tension between the Bormuth court and the Lund court was 
whether the role of a legislator is meaningfully distinct from that of an 
average citizen or a guest minister. The Lund court correctly 
identified the unique characteristics of a legislator, as opposed to 
those of a regular citizen, which makes a legislator-led prayer 
unconstitutional. 
As the Lund court pointed out, “[w]hen one of Rowan County’s 
commissioners leads his constituents in prayer, he is not just another 
private citizen,” but a “representative of the state.”221 To be a 
representative of the state is to be responsible for effectuating the 
best interests of all constituents, not the interests of some at the 
expense of others. As John Locke recognized, this means: 
[the] legislature is not only the supreme power of the 
commonwealth, but is sacred and unalterable in the hands in which 
the community have placed it; and no other person or organisation, 
whatever its form and whatever power it has behind it, can make 
edicts that have the force of law and create obligations as a law 
does unless they have been permitted to do this by the legislature 
that the public has chosen and appointed.222 
By attaining their position through the consent of the public, 
“legislative power is simply the combined power of every member of 
the society, which has been handed over to the person or persons 
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constituting the legislature.”223 The scope of legislative power is 
limited by the amount of power those people had “in the state of 
nature.”224 The outer limit of this power is “set by the good of the 
society as a whole.”225 Legislative power’s “only purpose is 
preservation, and therefore the legislature can never have a right to 
destroy, enslave, or deliberately impoverish the subjects.”226 
Legislators have not only tangible, law-making power, but also 
symbolic power. The court has held that, in public meetings, legislators 
cannot “act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes 
the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.”227 Instead, they are 
“obliged under the Free Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner 
neutral toward and tolerant of” all religious beliefs.228 The 
Constitution “commits government itself to religious tolerance, and 
upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem 
from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must 
pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the 
rights it secures.”229 
These “subtle departures from neutrality,” through legislators’ 
actions or inactions, may carry an emblematic significance to their 
constituents. For example, disavowing violence against a certain 
minority group in the community signals, to both the minority group 
and others, the community values that the legislators protect and 
endorse. Although passing legislation takes time, the normative 
outlook of a legislator, as manifested through words and actions, 
matters. Assuming that democracy is contingent on the informed 
participation of its members in the political process, safeguarding such 
access is fundamental to the role of legislators, who are, after all, the 
individuals working directly to uphold and maintain the democratic 
institution. 
Legislators leading open sessions with prayer, affirming one 
religion at the cost of others, and signaling to the community their 
endorsement of such a religion in their private and official capacity 
can weaken not only the relationship between minority religious 
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groups and the government, but also relationships within the 
community. Such a harm can be caused only by a person cloaked with 
government authority, not an ordinary person, for an ordinary person 
speaks only for herself. Further, heterogeneous prayer cannot be the 
solution to this problem for two reasons. First, even if a variety of 
beliefs are represented, in each instance of prayer the risk of 
denigrating other beliefs remains. Second, any endorsement or 
rejection of any religion by a legislator acting in his or her official 
capacity amounts to an unacceptable government endorsement of 
that religion over others. And, in places where one religion tends to be 
shared by the majority of a given population, that religion will tend to 
be represented more frequently in prayers, which precludes the 
government from upholding its duty of religious neutrality. 
Given this unacceptable result, legislators’ opening public 
meetings with prayer violates the Establishment Clause. The Supreme 
Court, therefore, should settle the circuit split and hold the practice to 
be unconstitutional. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rejecting the practices of legislative prayer in whole, or at least 
legislator-led prayer, is imperative for maintaining governmental 
religious neutrality, for creating a community that invites its members 
to participate in the political process, and for guarding against the 
psychological, physical, and systemic harms that accompany the 
government’s elevation of one religion by the government over all 
others. 
 
